A Dubious Case for the Continued Existence of the Developmental State – Reviewing Wade’s “The Developmental State: Dead or Alive?”

Image by the Global Development Institute.

The debate surrounding 'the developmental state’ theory and whether it still offers itself as a model for development, nevertheless less exists, is highly contested. With the neoliberal model for development emerging in response to a period of extended crises from the early-mid 1970s, many development experts argue that the developmental state is a thing of the past. Wade, however, viscerally disagrees with this notion, claiming that the developmental state is indeed alive, as evidenced by the East Asian developmental states – South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, most notably – which, he argues, “still undertake market-steering, ‘societal mission’ roles” well beyond the limits of neoliberalism (2018, abstract). Going so far as to develop a set of guidelines for the middle-income countries of today on how to implement developmental state policies, this article attempts to demonstrate that the developmental state theory continues to illuminate itself. Relying on fluff, egregious self-referencing and “personal communication” in his referencing, the article struggles to conclude that the developmental state is not dead.

When considering Wade’s argument, it is important to understand that Wade is not claiming that the East Asian developmental states still exist in their purist forms. Rather, he states that they have “’evolved’ in response to changing parameters” (Wade, 2018, p. 537). To add further clarity to his argument, he adds emphasis to the notion of developmental ambition (Thurbon, 2014 cited in Wade, 2018, p. 535), and the retainment of capacity for bureaucratic ideas and commitment as key elements of the developmental state theory that continues to exist in the East Asian region today (Wade, 2018, p. 537). This supposition of potential as a means for qualifying that the developmental state still exists does not hold significant weight. Furthermore, Wade declares that the developmental state in East Asia has transformed from 1.0 to 2.0, with the 1.0 meaning active state intervention and the 2.0 meaning the capacity for state intervention (Wade, 2018, p. 537). Can we call these different versions of the developmental state the same theory? Is this argument of capacity and ambition for state intervention solid grounds for the assertion that the developmental state theory still exists? The need for further insight around these questions makes the argument quite convoluted. It also does not address how a government’s political will and technical capacity can fend off exogenous forces (Mkandawire, 2011).

The argument of capacity and ambition are referred to towards the end of the article, whereas before presenting this rationalization, Wade takes the reader through pages of unnecessary and redundant verbiage. While his explanations of the developmental state and neoliberalism are thorough and well-written, one may even argue appreciated depending on the level of existing knowledge on the subject, Wade leaves the most salient part of the article for the very end – nine guidelines, or rules of thumb, for middle-income countries to use when framing developmental state policies today (2018, p. 539). Concluding that middle-income countries can raise the probability of sustaining economic momentum by activism beyond the Washington Consensus, while caveating that if done incorrectly there is the possibility of this key policy going wrong, Wade outlines a set of guidelines to offer these governments a framework for success (2018, p. 539). It is essentially a framework for the “catch-up” game, a rather nationalist notion that induces nations to seek the level of development of more developed states (Mkandawire, 2011). Within these guidelines he often references his older works, perhaps as an attempt to show that even years later the same principles apply. This begs the question, though, that if the developmental state has transformed as previously argued, then why recommend policies from nearly 30 years ago?

Perhaps there is a better interpretation of Wade’s argument that can be explored. Middle-income countries should take aspects of both the Washington Consensus and the East Asian developmental state models and apply them where fit, as discussed in the case of Vietnam’s industrial development (Masina, 2010, p. 4). Considering this reasoning, it is in tune with Wade’s proposition that the developmental state is indeed still alive, but argues to apply it only in certain instances, which leads into the notion of capacity and potential. This interpretation fizzles out quickly, though, as Wade makes a rather dubious claim stating, “we can be fairly sure that a state which follows neoliberal principles will find it very difficult to sustain growth over many decades, due to strong backwash effects” (Wade, 2018, p. 542). Not only does he reject neoliberalism in this statement, but he feels comfortable making such a conclusion based on being “fairly sure”. Given the examples and evidence referenced throughout the article, cited mostly from his own publications, one would expect a firmer and more confident conclusion. If Wade is such an advocate for the developmental state over neoliberalism, why not affirmatively state so? No need for feebleness if the argument is correct.

The article concludes with four questions posed by Wade, and thus I shall do the same. First, is the developmental state 2.0 to be considered with the same level of applicability as the developmental state 1.0? Second, do capacity and ambition serve as adequate qualifications for the assertion that the developmental state still exists? Third, does Wade expect the reader to truly consider his advice to middle-income countries, based largely on notions from the early 1990s, to be sound and relevant today? And fourth, if alive, can we be affirmatively sure that the developmental state model is the correct one to implement to counteract the shortcomings of neoliberal principles? This article does a fine job in setting up the debate of the continued existence of the developmental state, but it falls short on the conclusion that it is alive. In order to construct a more convincing argument, Wade should begin with answering the questions posed above.